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1. Introduction 
 
The present UK government has begun a radical overhaul of regional policy, as outlined 
in HM Treasury (2001) and HM Treasury et al  (2003). One particular change is the 
decentralisation and delegation of regional policy delivery in England to Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) that are motivated and controlled through target setting 
(McVittie and Swales, 2004a). A major argument for decentralisation is that indigenous 
institutions have informational advantages over central government in the delivery of a 
flexible and discretionary regional policy that is sensitive to local economic conditions 
(HM Treasury et al., (2003).1  
 
The specific concern in this paper is the co-ordination difficulties within such a regime 
where there are policy spillovers across regions and where these spillovers are not 
common knowledge amongst the government and the delegated agencies. At present 
although the English regions are extremely open, so that spillover effects are to be 
expected, there is no consensus as to the size or even the sign of such effects. Past work 
on identifying regional policy spillovers has not focussed on the impact on non-recipient 
regions or the nation as a whole (Taylor, 2002). What is more, the data on some of the 
channels through which such spillovers might act, in particular inter-regional trade and 
migration, are poor (Alsopp, 2003, McVittie and Swales, 2004b).  
 
We analyse this policy problem in a principal-agent framework, using a very simple 
model. In this model it is possible for both the government (the principal) and the 
regional agencies (the agents) to be either informed or uninformed about the nature of the 
inter-regional spillovers. Further, informed development agencies can either act non-
cooperatively or collusively in attempting to meet the policy targets. We demonstrate that 
different informational states and types of agency behaviour have very different 
implications for the payoffs from the decentralised, delegated policy with target setting. 
                                                          
1 In this paper we use the term local as synonymous with regional. Local does not imply a higher level 
of geographic disaggregation than regional.  
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We emphasise the importance of the central government being informed in order to set 
appropriate targets.  
 
Section 2 gives more background information on the recent changes in UK regional 
policy. Section 3 outlines a formal model with negative inter-regional spillovers. Section 
4 presents the model solutions. Section 5 discusses policy options for the government and 
Section 6 is a short conclusion.    
 
 2. Background 
 
The post-1997 Labour government introduced an innovative regional policy framework 
referred to as the new localism: the devolution or delegation of power and responsibility 
over regional policy to decentralised bodies (Balls, 2002). The distinction between 
devolution and delegation is important. In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
economic development has been devolved to the appropriate parliament or assembly 
which have a wide degree of freedom over their own development priorities, policy 
design and the associated allocation of resources (HM Treasury et al, 2003)2. On the 
other hand, in England regional policy has been decentralised and delegated. Central 
government allocates to English regions funds which are specifically earmarked for 
regional economic development. The expenditure of these funds is subject to controls set 
at the national level. The relevant regional institutions in England therefore have control 
over the manner in which regional policy is to be delivered. However, they do not control 
the aims or aggregate level of regional assistance. 
 
The bodies that lead in the local delivery of this policy in England are the newly formed 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). The RDAs are non-departmental public bodies 
(NDPBs). An NDPB is  [a] body which has a role in the process of national government, 
but is not a government department or part of one, and accordingly operates to a greater 
or lesser extent at arms length from Ministers (RDAUK Homepage). This gives the 
                                                          
2 At the time of writing, the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland are temporarily suspended and 
funding currently flows through the Northern Ireland Office. Additionally, the Scottish Parliament has 
limited independent tax-raising powers. 
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RDAs a degree of independence and flexibility when dealing with the private sector 
which government departments might lack. The government argues that delegating 
responsibility over regional policy allows the RDAs to use their region specific 
knowledge in order to exploit the indigenous strengths, and tackle the particular 
weaknesses, of each area (HM Treasury et al, 2003).  The English RDAs are allocated a 
significant budget which is forecast to be over £2 billion by 2005-6 (McVittie and 
Swales, 2004b). 
 
Although the RDAs have been given discretion over their use of resources, they are set 
targets for economic development and regeneration.
3
  These targets are linked to the 
Public Sector Agreement (PSA) targets held by the Departments that fund the activities 
of the English RDAs (HM Treasury et al, 2003). It is well known that using targets to 
control delegated agents has weaknesses as well as strengths (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992). We specifically investigate the effectiveness of a regional target setting regime 
where there are significant interregional policy spillovers. That is, where policy 
introduced in one region affects the economic performance of other regions, either 
positively or negatively. Examples of the channels through which such economic 
spillovers might flow include product and labour markets, migration, and informational 
networks (Ferguson et al, 2004; Fingleton, 2003). 
 
The government acknowledges that: policies developed and delivered by national, 
regional and local bodies must be properly co-ordinated (HM Treasury et al, 2003, p.4).  
However, a distinction should be made between policy co-ordination along vertical and 
horizontal lines.  The aim of vertical co-ordination is to ensure policies operating at the 
macroeconomic, microeconomic and regional levels complement one another.  
Horizontal co-ordination, on the other hand, is administered across policies operating at 
the same level. The government recognises the need for vertical co-ordination: 
 
                                                          
3 The government has introduced other institutional arrangements for monitoring and controlling English 
RDAs, alongside targets. Whilst these other mechanisms are generally given a lower profile in government 
documents, their true significance is probably underestimated (McVittie and Swales, 2004b).  
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The Government is committed to improve the co-ordination of policy at the 
regional level.  This is reflected in a further specific target for the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister to promote better policy integration nationally, regionally 
and locally (HM Treasury et al, 2003, p.15). 
 
However, whether the government sees the need for systematic horizontal co-ordination 
is less clear.  Furthermore, even if the government is aware of regional policy spillovers, 
it does not say how these will be accommodated in its target setting regime.  
 
3. A Formal Delegated-Policy Model with Negative Spillovers 
 
The broad characteristics of the model are as follows. A finance-constrained government 
department (subsequently referred to as the government) has a social welfare function 
whose arguments are measures of regional welfare. For individual regions, welfare is a 
function of two regional policy outputs and the government delegates policy delivery to 
decentralised economic development agencies.  Each agency is allocated a budget and 
known linear technologies transform efficient expenditure to policy outputs. However, 
one of the policy outputs generates a spatial externality. There are conventional moral 
hazard problems for the government. It cannot observe agency effort or misdirected 
expenditure, only policy outputs. It therefore sets targets for the policy outputs of the 
individual agencies, and there is an associated loss function if an agency fails to hit the 
targets.  
 
Essentially we adopt a principal-agent approach, with the government as the principal 
and the development agency as the agent (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). We therefore 
consider the governments attempt to set targets which optimise its pay-off, which is 
expressed as a welfare function. We do not treat the agencies participation constraints in 
a fully rigorous manner, though we assume that amongst the targets that will maximise 
the governments pay-off, the government will choose the set that minimise the cost to 
the agencies. This is consistent with the present Labour governments rule that targets 
should be SMART, where SMART is an acronym for Specific, Measurable, Achievable, 
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Relevant and Timed (HM Treasury, 2003). Targets that are attained will result in a zero 
(minimum) loss for the agencies.   
 
 More specifically, for pedagogic reasons, the model has 2 identical regions, regions i and 
j.
4
 The government has a Cobb-Douglas welfare function, W, in the regions utilities, 
where the utility of each region has equal weight, so that: 
 
(1) log log n
n
W U ¦  
 
where U
n
 is utility in region n.
5
 Regional utility is itself a Cobb-Douglas function of the 
two policy outputs, 1 and 2: 
 
(2)  1 2log log (1 ) log
n nU QD D   nQ
k
                                                          
 
 where Q
n
k is the output of policy k in region n, and Į is the weight given to policy output 
1. 
 
3.1 No regional spillovers 
 
To begin, we consider a situation where there are no spillovers. This implies that the 
regional policy outputs are determined as: 
 
(3)  n nk kQ PJ 
 
where P
n
k is the expenditure on policy k in region n, and Ȗk is a fixed technical coefficient 
determining the transformation of expenditure into policy output k. Equation (3) is 
conditional on two important considerations. The first is that the policy is delivered 
locally. If it is delivered outwith the region, the value of Jk is much lower. Second, the 
4 An extension to n regions is relatively straightforward. 
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policy is being pursued with maximum effort. As long as these two conditions hold, we 
assume policy can be delivered at a uniform efficiency that does not vary between the 
two regions. 
 
Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) produces: 
 
(4) > @1 2 1log log (1 ) log 2 log (1 ) logn n
n n
W P P 2D D D J D     ¦ ¦ J  
  
It is straightforward to show that under these circumstances, the first best outcome for the 
government is for the budget to be divided equally across all regions and for the 
distribution of expenditure between policy outputs 1 and 2 to be 
1
D
D  (see Appendix). 
Note that the optimal distribution of expenditures is independent of the efficiency with 
which these expenditures are transformed into policy outputs. This is a characteristic of 
the Cobb-Douglas functional form. This eases the subsequent exposition, because the 
first best outcome will always involve a fixed distribution of expenditures between 
different policy outputs. In order to get round the moral hazard problem, if the total 
budget for the RDA programme is B, the identical attainable output targets T1 and T2 set 
for each agency should be: 
 
(5) 1 21 2
(1 )
,
2 2
B BT TDJ D J   
 
3.2 Regional spillovers 
 
To incorporate regional spillovers we begin with a very simple model. First, with no loss 
of generality, we calibrate output so that J1 = J2 = 1. Second, for heuristic reasons we 
weight the two policy outputs equally, so that 
1
2
D  . Similarly we set the total budget, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 This welfare function reflects that recommended in the UK Green Book for policy evaluation (HM 
Treasury, 2003). 
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B, equal to 2. With homogeneous regions, this means that in equilibrium each will be 
assigned a budget equal to unity so that policy expenditure levels for an individual region 
can be immediately interpreted as shares. Finally, expenditure on policy 1 in one region 
has a negative spillover on the level of output 1 in the other region, whilst expenditure on 
policy 2 generates no spillover effects.  
 
Scottish Enterprise, the regional development agency in Scotland, provides good 
examples of both types of policy. Ferguson et al (2004) reports simulations showing 
negative output and employment effects on the rest of the UK from policies supported by 
the agency to Grow the global reach of Scottish companies.
6
 Their aim is to stimulate 
Scottish exports, and they are examples of Policy 1. However, there are other policies 
that fulfil a primarily social, as opposed to an economic, role and which therefore are 
unlikely to have effects outwith the region. Such a policy is Narrowing the gap between 
unemployed in the worst areas of Scotland and the Scottish average, whose main focus 
is to invest in human capital in order to reduce unemployment in the most deprived areas 
of Scotland (Scottish Enterprise, 2002). This is an example of Policy 2. 
 
Defining the degree of spillover effects as I, the outputs from regional policy with 
spillover effects in region i are: 
 
(6) 1 1 1
i iQ P P jI   
(7) 2 2
i iQ P   
 
It is assumed that 0 1I  .  This implies that the spillover effect is strictly less than the 
direct effectiveness of policy 1.  If this were not the case, a rational government would 
allocate no expenditure to policy 1. 
 
Again, for the government the first-best solution with spillovers is for expenditure on the 
two polices to reflect the weights in the regional utility function (as in the maximisation 
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of equation 4 under a budget constraint). Here, this would be an equal division. 
Essentially for the government the spillovers act in a similar way to a reduction in the 
value of the efficiency parameter, J1. For each region the optimal expenditures and 
subsequent policy outputs are: 
(8) 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1
, ,
2 2
i j i j i j i jP P P P Q Q Q Q 1
2
I         
 
We wish to explore how far these optimal outcomes are achievable under a target setting 
regime with various informational difficulties and collusive possibilities.  
 
2.3 The target setting regime 
 
We begin by outlining how the behaviour of the agencies is affected by the introduction 
of a target setting regime. The agencies will be punished for deviating from targets set by 
the government, where this punishment consists of adverse reputation and labour market 
effects. We use the same form of loss function as popularised in the literature on 
monetary targets (Barro and Gordon, 1983; Rogoff, 1985): 
 
(9)    2 21 1 2 2Q T Q T/     
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
where ȁ is the total loss and Tk is the target for policy output k. For this loss function, as 
the distance from the target increases, the agency suffers a higher loss, and the marginal 
loss increases as the agency moves further from the target. 
 
Equation (9) implies a symmetrical target: the costs of over- and under-achievement are 
equal. Such an assumption is clearly appropriate for the inflation rate target set by the UK 
government for the Monetary Policy Committee, where the government requires a 
predictable, and stable, inflation rate. In a regional policy context, however, it is likely 
that the targets will be asymmetric, in that the government will impose no punishment for 
 
6 Although with shorter time periods or different models, spillovers might also be positive (Ferguson et al, 
2004; Fingleton, 2003). 
 10
exceeding a target: in general, we expect the government to prefer more regional policy 
output than less.
7
 However, we have not explicitly modelled development agency effort. 
We therefore identify the loss involved in exceeding the target as being the cost to the 
agency of excess effort. This means that under all circumstances where the target is 
achievable within its budget, the agency will prefer to hit the target with minimum effort, 
rather than over shoot the target.  
 
The agency therefore chooses policy output levels that minimise its loss function, subject 
to the appropriate constraints.  The effect of setting output targets can now be analysed by 
comparing the agencies loss-minimising outputs with the first-best output levels given 
by equation (8). We consider a number of scenarios in which economic actors have 
alternative information about spillovers. 
 
Agencies can be informed or uninformed about spillover effects. If they are uninformed, 
both the agencies believe the value of I to be zero and interpret any under-performance in 
producing Q1 to have some unobserved exogenous cause. If the agencies are informed, 
the true value of I is common knowledge to both agencies. Similarly, the government can 
be either informed or uninformed about the value of I, with an uniformed government 
again believing the value of I to be zero. 
 
For informed agencies there are two options concerning their degree of collusion or 
coordination in achieving targets. First, they can set their policy expenditure levels 
independently, in a non-cooperative manner. Second, they can collude and jointly set 
their expenditure levels to minimise the combined loss.     
 
4. Model Solutions 
 
4.1 Uninformed regional agencies 
                                                          
7 There is some uncertainty here. In general one would think that over-performing development agencies 
would be positively valued. However, one of the present Labour governments Public Sector Agreement 
(PSA) targets is to reduce growth differentials between regions. This seems to imply that if high growth 
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 Each uninformed regional agency will choose the expenditure level that minimises its 
loss function, on the false belief that there are no spillovers, so that it expects policy 
outputs to be give by equation (3), with Ȗ1 = Ȗ2 =1. Slightly reordering equation (9), 
dropping the regional superscript, and introducing the budget constraint implies that we 
need to maximising the following Lagrangean with respect to P1, P2 and O for region n: 
 
(10)     
1 2
2 2
, , 1 1 2 2 1 2ax 1P P M L P T P T PO O        P
2
 
 
If the budget constraint does not bind, so that Ȝ = 0, the Lagrangian is maximised where: 
 1 1 2,P T P T   
Where the budget constraint binds, the Lagrangian is maximised where: 
 1 2 1 21 2
1 1
,
2 2
T T T TP P      
If the government wishes to maximise its welfare, it should therefore set: 
 
(11) 1 2
1
2
T T t  
 
For the targets to minimize the cost to the agencies, expression (11) should be set as an 
equality and the ex post payoff to each agency will be 
2
4
I . 
 
In this case, the government maximises its welfare function by setting demanding 
targets that are unattainable ex post. This raises the issue of the agencies participation 
constraint. Can the government maintain a credible target setting regime where targets 
are systematically not achieved? The strategy adopted is ex-ante, but not ex-post, optimal 
for the agencies. Because each agency is unaware of any spillover effects, it expects 
                                                                                                                                                                             
regions over perform, that this would be unwelcome, though we have never seen this point explicitly 
discussed in the government literature on target setting as applied to the new localism.  
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output levels of Q1 = Q2 = 1
2
. However, the spillover from expenditure on policy 1 by the 
agency in the other region results in the output levels shown in equation (8), pushing the 
performance of each development agency further away from T1 than expected and 
increasing its loss. Clearly in a repeated game situation we expect the agency to adapt its 
allocation of funds between the different policies. In Section 4.3 we investigate such a 
dynamic adaptation process. 
 
4.2 Informed non-cooperative development agencies 
 
In this case both development agencies simultaneously choose their policy expenditures, 
taking into account the spillover effect of policy decisions taken by the agency in the 
other region.  The solution to this problem, the Nash equilibrium, is the point where each 
region chooses its optimal level of policy given the choice by the other region. 
 
Region i maximizes the following Lagrangian: 
 
(12)      
1 2
2 2
1 1 1 2 2 1 2. ,
1i i
i j i i
P P
iMax L P P T P T P PO I O          
(13) 
 1 1 1
1
2 0i ji
L P P T
P
I Ow       w
 
 
(14) 
 2 2
2
2 0ii
L P T
P
Ow      w
 
 
Assuming the budget constraint binds: 
  
 (15) 1 21
i iL P PO 0
w     w   
 
Setting  (13) equal to (14) and using (15) gives:: 
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(16) 1 2 11
1
2 2
j
i T T PP I    
 
Equation (16) is region is reaction function, which gives the optimal choice of policy 
expenditure by the development agency in region i, given the level of policy expenditure 
in region j.  It is linear in (P1i, P1j) space. The budget for each agency is fixed, so that the 
higher is expenditure on policy 1 in region j, the more the agency in region i will shift 
expenditure from policy 2 to policy 1.  Since the regions are identical, region js reaction 
function is simply equation (16) with the i and j superscripts reversed. The reaction 
functions, R
i
 and R
j
, for the development agencies in regions i and j are shown in Figure 
1, for the values T1 = T2 = 
1
2
. 
 
The point where the reaction functions intersect is the Nash equilibrium. Substituting the 
reaction function for P
j
1 into equation (16) and solving for P
i
1 produces: 
 
(17) 1 21 1
1
2
i j T TP P I
       
where 
(18)  
1 1 1 2
1 22
1
, 0
2
i jP P T T if T TI I I
w w  
1 !  !w w   
For ex ante attainable targets, where both policy outputs have a positive value, 1>T1, T2 
>0. This implies that the condition on the inequality in expression (18) always holds. 
therefore for the Nash equilibrium, the bigger the negative spillover for output 1, the 
greater the switch of expenditure towards that policy output.  
 
Where the government is uninformed about the spillover effects and sets the otherwise 
optimal targets: 
 
 1 2
1
2
T T    
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 the Nash equilibrium level of Pi1 and Pj1 is higher, and the value of Pi2 and Pj2 lower, than 
the first-best level: 
 
(19) *1 1
1 1
2 2
i jP P PI 1  !     
 
Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium level of P1n increases as the spillover effect increases.  
 
4.3 Uninformed, dynamically adjusting development agencies 
 
Imagine the agencies are uninformed concerning the spillovers, but interpret any failure 
to meet the target for policy 1 as resulting from some unobserved exogenous disturbance. 
In a repeated game with fixed targets, an equilibrium with policy outcomes identical to 
the Nash will be reached through dynamic iteration. In this case, equation (6) should be 
replaced with equations (20) and (21): 
 
(20)  1, 1, 1i it tE Q P K it   
(21) 1 1,
i j
t tK PI 1   
 
where E(Q
i
1,t) is the expected value of Q
i
1,t, and Kt-1 is an influence on the attainment of 
output 1 in region i which is treated as exogenous by the agency in region i. However, 
this exogenous factor is in fact the negative spillover from region j, given by equation 
(21). If in each round the agencies attempt to adjust to take account of changes in the 
exogenous factor in the previous round, we have a lagged reaction function, so that:  
 
(22) 
1, 11 2
1,
1
2 2
j
ti
t
PT TP
I     
 
Given that the regions are symmetrical, so that P
i
1,t  = P
j
1,t, the lagged reaction function 
(22) becomes a linear first-order difference equation:   
 15
 (23) 
1, 11 2
1,
1
2 2
i
ti
t
PT TP
I     
 
Equilibrium is found where P
i
1,t  = P
i
1,t-1, which produces an outcome identical to the 
Nash equilibrium given in equation (17). Figure 2 gives the period-by-period adjustment, 
again where T1 = T2 = 
1
2
.  
  
4.4 The Collusive Solution 
 
In the Nash equilibrium, each agency fails to internalise the negative spillover effect its 
policy has on the other regions economy.  This is inefficient from two perspectives.  
First, unless the government adjusts the targets appropriately, the actions of the agencies 
are sub-optimal from an economic welfare viewpoint.  When negative spillovers are 
present, the agencies allocate more expenditure to policy 1 and less to policy 2 than the 
first-best levels.  Furthermore, as the size of the spillover effect increases, the level of P1 
increases, moving it further and further away from the social optimum. Secondly, the 
actions of the agencies are sub-optimal in terms of minimising their joint losses.  The 
non-collusive equilibrium is not Pareto efficient from the point of view of the agencies 
taken together, and the two agencies could reallocate expenditure between policies in a 
way that makes them both better off.   
 
In the Nash equilibrium agencies do not collude when deciding expenditures on different 
policies.  What happens when agencies collude?  In this case, the agencies set the levels 
of P1 and P2 that minimise their joint loss functions.  This is equivalent to each region 
taking account of the spillover effect by setting the effectiveness of expenditure on policy 
1, Ȗ1, to 1-I and solving. Again, dropping the superscripts:: 
 
(24)      
1 2
2 2
, , 1 1 2 2 1 21 1P P Max L P T P T P PO I O          
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(25)     1 1
1
2 1 1 0
L P T
P
I I Ow        w  
  
(26) 
 2 2
2
2
L P T
P
Ow 0     w      
 
Assuming the targets are set so that the budget constraint holds: 
 
(27) 1 21
L P PO 0
w     w       
Solving for P1: 
 
(28) 
 
 1 21 2
1 1
2 1
T T
P
I
I I
       
 
This is the optimal level of expenditure on policy 1 from the point of view of the agencies 
taken together, given a set of targets for policies 1 and 2.  
 
By reducing the loss borne by the agencies, collusion pulls the policy outcomes closer to 
the targets. It is straightforward to show that where the government is ignorant of the 
level of spillovers, and therefore sets 1 2
1
2
T T  , and the collusive, non-cooperative and 
uninformed values are given the superscripts C, N and U respectively: 
 
(29) 1 1 1
1
2
N C UP P P! !   
 
Also in this case if the ratio of the non-cooperative to collusive expenditure on sector 1 is 
labelled as R, so that 1
1
, 0
N
C
P RR
P I
w !w . 
 
5. Policy Options for Government 
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 If the government is informed of the size of the spillover effects it can induce the optimal 
symmetrical expenditures on the policies 1 and 2 through setting asymmetrical targets. 
These are determined by solving equation (17) or (28) for the value P
n
1 = 
1
2
and ensuring 
that in equilibrium the agency is just on its budget constraint. The appropriate targets are: 
 
(30) 1 2
1 1
,
2 2
T TI   .   
 
Of course, these are the outputs given in equation (8). These targets are only optimal with 
informed agencies. Where agencies are uninformed, these targets will not be met as the 
agencies will devote too little effort to output 1. However, even here, as demonstrated 
Section 4.3, with unchanged targets, agencies adjust their policy output over time, and the 
optimal policy outputs will be attained eventually with targets as set in (30). The 
adjustment path will be sub-optimal, although a changing set of targets could be devised 
to generate the optimal adjustment path. 
  
Table 1 shows the pay-offs to the government (the value of the welfare function) and to 
the regional agencies (the value of the loss function) under various assumptions about the 
information that they hold. In this numerical example, the value of I is assumed to be 1
2
.  
 
If the agencies are uninformed, then both an informed and uniformed government will set 
the same targets, 
1 1
,
2 2
. In attempting to hit these targets, the agencies divide the funds 
equally between the two policies, thereby maximising the governments welfare function 
at 0.125. The main problem in this case is that the agencies fail to hit the targets that they 
believed to be attainable ex ante. They suffer a combined loss of 0.125. Further we 
expect an adjustment to the agencies budget allocation were the target setting procedure 
repeated. If the government does not change the targets, subsequent adjustments by the 
development agencies move the economy towards the uninformed, non-cooperative 
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outcome, as shown in Section 4.3. This reduces the pay-off to the government and, in this 
case, improves the position of the development agencies. Whilst they still fail to hit the 
targets, their loss is reduced.  
 
If the agencies are informed, or become informed through the repeated playing of the 
game, then it is better for all players if the government is also informed. The pay-offs to 
all players are higher where the government is informed, because the government can 
then set optimal targets for the agencies. In the absence of these optimal targets, the 
government sets unobtainable targets, which are costly for the agencies, and the agencies 
respond with policy outputs that are sub-optimal from the governments perspective. For 
example, with the Cobb-Douglas welfare function, if the agencies do not cooperate in 
allocating their expenditure between policies, the pay-off to the government is 9% less 
than the optimal, simply as a result of poor policy co-ordination. 
 
If the government is uninformed but the agencies informed, then in the Cobb-Douglas 
case, the governments co-ordination difficulties are reduced if the agencies collude. 
Reducing the agencies losses moves the policy outcome closer to the targets, and here 
this outcome is closer to the governments constrained welfare maximum.  
 
At this point, a number of practical issues should be raised. First, the model we have 
considered is very straightforward in that there is only one source of uncertainty for the 
government, which is the value of the spillover parameter I. However, there is likely to 
be uncertainty about the efficiency parameters, Ȗ1and Ȗ2, too. One way of enforcing the 
efficient policy delivery is through benchmark competition: the effectiveness of 
individual agencies is measured against one another. However, collusion between 
agencies, which in this case improves the policy outcomes where informed agencies face 
an uninformed government, reduces the power of benchmark competition. 
 
Second, the informational asymmetries that underpin the arguments for a delegated and 
decentralised regional policy typically refer to policy delivery; because local agencies 
have a more intimate knowledge of their own regional economies they should be able to 
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devise more appropriate policy interventions. However, it might be difficult for local 
agencies to recognize and quantify spillover effects: their identification needs knowledge 
of the operation of other agencies in other regional economies. If the government has 
information on the size of spillovers, they should share this with the regional agencies. 
Such information is credible because it is irrational for the government to lie. However, if 
the agencies have information on spillovers and the government does not, in a cheap-talk 
game it is not in the interests of the agencies to tell the truth about the size of the 
spillovers. They will wish to overestimate negative spillovers in order to be set easy 
targets. Of course, the government knows this and therefore fails to believe the 
development agencies. Even if solutions exist to this kind of problem, they rule out full 
transparency (Gibbons, 1992). 
 
Third, up to now we have considered only negative spillovers. However, a model with 
positive inter-regional spillovers generates qualitatively different results. In particular, if 
the regional agencies are informed but the government is not, the agencies budget 
constraints will not bind. The agencies will therefore just hit their targets, but the 
government will be unaware that any spillovers exist. 
 
Finally, the paper focuses on the most straightforward case - policy coordination amongst 
two symmetrical regions. In fact England has nine RDAs, which represent regions of 
very different sizes, economic problems and per capita aid. The heterogeneity of the 
English regions and their problems is one of the main arguments for the new localism. 
However, this is likely to make optimal target setting even more problematic if the size 
(and even sign) of the spillover parameter can vary between regions.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Regional policy spillovers pose serious difficulties within a target setting regime. The 
existence of spillovers changes the trade-off between different policy outputs. Further, 
the impact on the behaviour of regional development agencies, given a set of targets, will 
depends on whether the agencies are aware of the spillovers, and if so, how far the 
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agencies collude. Finally negative spillovers are likely to lead to unattainable targets 
being set which impose costs on the development agencies and might breach their 
participation constraints. The most problematic situations occur where the government is 
uninformed. However, the thrust of the UK policy of the new localism is based on the 
belief that the relevant information is concentrated at the regional level. This has clear 
dangers for policies that generate spillovers.  
 
First, even if policy delivery is more efficiently done at the local level, the development 
agencies are likely to have difficulty detecting spillovers, particularly where these operate 
through general market mechanisms. Second, even if the agencies are informed about the 
size and nature of the spillovers, if the government is uninformed, the outcome will be 
sub-optimal. Whilst the agencies can, through collusion, get closer to the targets, if the 
targets are incorrectly set, this does not guarantee more effective policy. Third, it is 
difficult for the development agencies to credibly inform the government about the 
negative spillovers. For the new localism framework to deal effectively with spillovers it 
needs to incorporate active central information gathering and coordination presence, even 
in an otherwise decentralised system.  
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The first order conditions are: 
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Equations (A2) to (A6) again all for n equals i,j. 
 
From equations (A2) and (A3): 
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From equations (A2), (A3) and (A5): 
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From (A4), (A6) and (A8): 
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The first best solution for the government is therefore that the budget is divided equally 
between regions i and j and that in each region expenditure between policy outputs 1 and 
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2 is divided in the ratio given by the weights in the utility function. Note that this is 
independent of the values of the efficiency parameters, Ȗ1 and  Ȗ2. 
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Table 1: Values for government welfare and agency loss under various assumptions 
about information and agency collusion (government pay-off shown first, combined 
agencies’ pay-off second). 
   
Regional Agencies 
Informed 
Government 
Uninformed 
Non-cooperative Collusive 
Uninformed 0.125, -0.125 0.111, -0.111 0.120, -0.10 
Informed 0.125, -0.125 0.125, 0 0.125, 0 
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Figure 1: The reaction functions, R1 and R2 and Nash equilibrium, NE, for regions 1 
and 2, where 1 2
1
2
T T   jR
 
1
2
 
1
2
1
2 I  
1
2 I  
1
1
1
2 2
j
i iPP RI    1
iP  
1
jP
NE 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The phase line and iterated equilibrium, IE, for region i, Fi, where 
1 2
1
2
T T   
 27
0 
1,
i
tP  
45o
1
2
1
2 I  
1
2 I  
IE 
1, 1
i
tP  
1, 1
1,
1
2 2
i
ti i
t
P
P F
I    
Strathclyde Discussion Paper Series: 2004 
  
04-01 Julia Darby, V. Anton Muscatelli and Graeme Roy 
 Fiscal Consolidation and Decentralisation: A Tale of Two Tiers 
 
04-02 Jacques Mélitz  
 Risk Sharing and EMU 
 
04-03 Frank H Stephen and Stefan van Hemmen 
 Market Mobilised Capital, Legal Rules and Enforcement 
 
04-04 Peter McGregor, J Kim Swales and Karen Turner 
 An Input-Output Based Alternative to “Ecological Footprints” for Tracking Pollution 
Generation in a Small Open Economy 
 
04-05 G Allan, N D Hanley, P G McGregor, J K Swales and K R Turner 
 An Extension and Application of the Leontief Pollution Model for Waste Generation and 
Disposal in Scotland 
 
04-06 Eric McVittie and J Kim Swales 
 ‘Constrained Discretion’ in UK Monetary Regional Policy 
 
04-07 Roy H Grieve 
 Price Flexibility and Full Employment: Losing the Plot? 
 
04-08 Peter G. McGregor, Donald McLellan, Karen R. Turner and J. Kim Swales 
 Attribution of Pollution Generation to Local Private and Public Demands in a Small Open 
Economy: Results from a SAM-Based Neo-Classical Linear Attribution System for 
Scotland 
 
04-09 Roy H Grieve 
 Roncaglia on Sraffa and Wittgenstein: Further Comment 
 
04-10 Giorgio Fazio 
 Extreme Interdependence and Extreme Contagion between Emerging Markets 
 
04-11 Ramesh Chandra 
 Saving, Investment and Growth: A Smithian Perspective 
 
04-12 Roger Perman and Christophe Tavera 
 Testing for Convergence of the Okun’s Law Coefficient in Europe 
 
04-13 Linda Ferguson, Peter G McGregor, J Kim Swales, Karen R Turner and Ya Ping Yin 
 Incorporating Sustainability Indicators into a Computable Equilibrium Model of the Scottish 
Economy 
 28
 04-14 Christophe Tavera and Roger Perman 
 A Cross-Country Analysis of the Okun’s Law Coefficient Convergence in Europe 
 
04-15 Julia Darby, Anton Muscatelli and Graeme Roy 
 Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal Consolidations and Cuts in Central Government Grants: 
Evidence from an Event Study 
 
04-16 Brian Ashcroft, Darryl Holden and Kenneth Low 
 Potential Entrepreneurs and the Self-Employment Choice Decision 
 
04-17 Brian Ashcroft, Darryl Holden and Kenneth Low 
 Estimating Earnings in an Employment Status Model with Banded Data 
 
04-18 Carl Gaigné and Stéphane Riou 
 Globalization, Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization 
 
04-19 Eric McVittie and J Kim Swales 
 The Information Requirements for an Effective Regional Policy: A Critique of the Allsopp 
Report 
 
04-20 L Ferguson, D Learmonth, P G McGregor, D McLellan, J K Swales and K Turner 
 The National Impact of Regional Policy: Policy Simulation with Labour Market Constraints 
in a Two-Region Computable General Equilibrium Model 
 
04-21 P G McGregor, J K Swales and K R Turner 
 The Environmental ‘Trade Balance’ Between Scotland and the Rest of the UK: An Inter-
Regional Input-Output and SAM Analysis 
 
04-22 Grant Allan, P G McGregor, J Kim Swales and Karen Turner 
 Construction of a Multi-Sectoral Inter-Regional IO and SAM Database for the UK 
 
04-23 Grant J Allan, Fraser Jamieson, Peter G McGregor, J Kim Swales, and Karen Turner  
 Three and Four-Region Linear Modelling with UK Data: Some Preliminary Results 
(forthcoming) 
 
04-24 David Learmonth and J Kim Swales  
 Policy Spillovers in a Regional Target-Setting Regime 
 
 29
